Florida Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 4

June 1964

Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining–Operational Changes
Robert N. Golden
Frederick P. Tiballi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert N. Golden and Frederick P. Tiballi, Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining–Operational Changes, 17 Fla.
L. Rev. 109 (1964).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

1964]

Golden and Tiballi: Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining–Operational Changes
NOTES

MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
OPERATIONAL CHANGES

-

In today's expanding economy management's need for operational
flexibility is of vital importance. The demands of a constantly changing market combined with increased competition necessitate periodic
reassessments by management of its economic position. Such reassessments often indicate the need to make changes in the operational
structure of the business. For example, management may be faced
with a decision to subcontract certain work, to sell or move the plant,
to merge with another firm, to install labor replacing equipment, or
to go out of business entirely.
Employers generally claim that arriving at these decisions is
strictly a management prerogative, that management assumes the risk
of capital investment and therefore such decisions are "none of the
union's business." Juxtaposed against this right of management are
the needs of the employees who are often skilled in a particular job
and may not be able to make use of these skills if their jobs are
eliminated. The unions, as the representatives of the employees, have
argued that because operational decisions adversely affect their members they should be the subject of joint determination between union
and management.
Since 1935 the Wagner Act has required the employer to recognize and meet with the elected representatives of his employees; 1
however, the formulation and interpretation of the ground rules for
this meeting, that is, collective bargaining, have been delegated to
the National Labor Relations Board.2 The Board, in a long line of
decisions 3 has made it dear that the parties are not compelled to

1. National Labor Relations Act §8 (a) (5), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §158 (a) (5) (1958).

2. See, e.g., Address by John J. Adams, Conference on Recent Developments
in Labor Law, Washington, D.C., Oct. 4, 1963, in 54 LAB. REL. REP. 165; Address
by Board Member Brown, Seventh Annual Conference on Current Trends in
Collective Bargaining, Univ. of Tenn., Nov. 7, 1962, in 51 L.R.R.M. 96; Address

by Board Member Fanning before the Ninth Annual Institute on Labor Law,
Dallas, Tex., Oct. 19, 1962, in 51 L.R.R.M. 86; Address by Boyd Leedom, Univ. of
Chicago Seminar on Collective Bargaining, April 16, 1963, in 52 LAB. REL. REP.
413; Address by Arnold Ordman before Ga. Bar Ass'n, March 15, 1963, in 52
L.R.R.M. 86; Address by Stuart Rothman before Labor Law Section of the Wis.
Bar Ass'n, Milwaukee, Wis., Feb. 15, 1963, in 52 L.R.R.M. 57.
3. See NLRB v. Swift & Co., 127 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Griswold
Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939); Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94
F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938); N. Ben Weiner, 71
N.L.R.B. 888 (1946); Interstate S.S. Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1941); Stonewall Cotton
Mills, 36 N.L.R.B. 240 (1941), enforced as modified, 129 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 667 (1942); Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), en-
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agree, but must approach negotiations in good faith, with an open
4
mind, and make a reasonable effort to reach agreement.
Section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a codification of a longstanding position of the Board, provides that, "to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment ... "5
The Board, with the Supreme Court's approval in NLRB v. Borg
Warner Corp.,6 has placed the subjects of bargaining into three
classifications: mandatory, permissive or nonmandatory, and prohibited The employer decides at his peril the appropriate classification of a bargaining subject, for he may misjudge and place a
subject in the wrong category, or the Board may change the classification of a particular subject. 8
Mandatory bargaining issues fall within the section 8 (d) phrase
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"' and
are the required subjects of bargaining. This class has been continuously expanded by the Board to include almost every conceivable
subject of wages, fringe benefits, and conditions of employment.
The Board has formulated a second class of bargaining subjects

forced as modified, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941);
Pilling & Son, 16 N.L.R.B. 650 (1939), enforced, 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941); Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enforced, 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir.
1940); Scandore Paper Box Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 910 (1938); Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B.
10 (1938); Atlantic Ref. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 359 (1936); Houde Eng'r Corp., I
N.L.R.B. 35 (1934).
4. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme
Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act
stated: "The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees.
It does not compel any agreement whatever." Id. at 45.
5. National Labor Rtlations Act §8 (d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (d)
(1958). (Emphasis added.)
6. 356 U.S. 342 (1958): The Court noted that §8(a) (5), which makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees" when read in light of §8 (d), which states, in
part, that to bargain collectively includes the obligation to meet and confer in good
faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" established the obligation of the parties "to bargain with each other in
good faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment .... "
The Court concluded that "the duty is limited to those subjects, and within that
area, neither party is legally obligated to yield." Id. at 349.
7. A detailed grouping of the classifications of bargaining subjects is found in
McManemin, Subject Matter of Collective Bargaining, 13 LAB. L.J. 985 (1962).
8. See note 16 infra.
9. National Labor Relations Act §8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d)
(1958).
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that are "permissive" or nonmandatory.10 These are subjects "you can
bargain about if you want to and the other fellow is willing." 11 This
class of bargaining subjects apparently embraces all issues that are
neither mandatory nor illegal. The ostensible effect of the distinction is that a mandatory subject of bargaining may in good faith
be insisted upon to the point of impasse, or a breakdown in the
negotiations, but a nonmandatory subject may not in good faith be
forced as a condition precedent to agreement on other subjects."
Both parties, if willing, are free to agree on a nonmandatory subject,
and the resulting contract will be enforceable.
Forbidden or nonbargainable subjects include matters that are independently unlawful"13 These subjects might be referred to as "the
Elliot Ness or vestal virgin type subjects, untouchable and beyond
reach."14
The fact that a party negotiates in good faith on a mandatory subject of bargaining does not give him the right "to refuse to enter
into agreements on the ground that they do not include some proposal which is not a mandatory subject of bargaining." 15 The determination of which subjects are mandatory and which are nonmandatory is of far-reaching importance to an employer. He may insist in good faith to the point of impasse on an issue he believes to be
10. Wooster Div. of Borg Warner Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955).
11. Address by John J. Adams, Conference on Recent Developments in Labor
Law, Washington, D.C., Oct. 4, 1963 in 54 LAB. REL. REP. 165.
12. E.g., Excello Dry Wall Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1963) (where union
insisted, as a condition to entering a contract, that employer establish a fund as
security for payment of wages and fringe benefits, it violated the Act as such
demand was not a mandatory subject of bargaining); Mill Floor Covering, Inc.,
136 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963) (industry promotion fund not a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Act thus union
violated the Act by insisting that the contract provide for such a fund); Arlington
Asphalt Co., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1962), enforced, 318 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1963)
(an indemnity bond under which the union would be required to compensate the
employer if the employer is picketed by other unions is not a proper subject of
bargaining under the Act; hence an employer may not insist on such a bond as
the price for signing a contract).
13. E.g., Simplicity Pattern Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1953) (employer may not
bargain about his duty to grant exclusive recognition to the union); American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951) (union may
not request inclusion of a closed shop provision); Sherwin-Williams Co., 34
N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforced, 130 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1942).
14. Address by John J. Adams, supra note 11.
15. NLRB v. Borg Warner Corp., supra note 6. Applying that definition to
the facts in the case, the Court held that a local uncertified union was not required
to bargain with respect to employer demands that (1) the local's international be
excluded from recognition although it was in fact the certified representative; and
(2) a prestrike secret vote of all employees (union and nonunion) be held for
acceptance or rejection of the employer's last offer.
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a mandatory subject of bargaining, however, if the Board subsequently
decides that such issue is nonmandatory, the "recalcitrant" party is
deemed guilty of an unfair labor practicel6 despite his good intentions.
In deciding whether the parties are bargaining in good faith, the
Board of necessity must determine the subjects about which employers
and unions are required to bargain. Since its only guide is the
broad language of section 8 (d) of the Act that requires the parties
bargain in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment," the Board's determination is necessarily almost wholly subjective.
Much of the voluminous litigation before the Board and the courts
arises because of the failure of the Board to set forth adequate guidelines as to what issues fall within the realm of mandatory bargaining
subjects. In this area the duty of the Board should be preventive
rather than remedial. The remedy imposed by the Board on a company that has mistakenly refused to bargain or taken unilateral action
with respect to a mandatory subject of bargaining can be disastrous.
For example, where management has taken unilateral action in subcontracting work, which results in a decrease or destruction of the
bargaining unit, the standard remedy is abrogation of the subcontracting agreement, reinstatement of the displaced employees, and
back pay from the date of the discharge. 17 Management's lack of
adequate knowledge of current Board policies is illustrated by the
following results of a survey conducted in 1964.18

16. Indeed, the employer is taking a chance when he relies on past Board
precedents, e.g., General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962) (modifying to
three years the two-year contract-ban rule in effect since 1947); A.P.W. Products
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 25 (1962) (changing a twenty-six year old rule); Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962) (reversing a ruling handed down in the same
case a year earlier); Calumet Contractors Ass'n 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961) (reversing
a decision handed down in the same case a year earlier); General Motors Corp.,
133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd
by General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (reversing a prior holding in the
same case upon petition for reconsideration); Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.,
133 N.L.R.B. 104 (1961) (reversing a ruling handed down less than a year before).
17. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on reconsideration, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced sub nom. East Bay Union of
Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted as to employer,
84 Sup. Ct. 490 (1964), denied as to union, 84 Sup. Ct. 491 (1964).
18. In a survey conducted by the authors the presidents of one hundred
national firms and the presidents of one hundred Florida firms were requested to
give their personal attitudes on the bargaining status of these issues. Thirty-four
national and eighteen Florida firms responded. There is of course no way of
knowing how many of the presidents answered the questionnaires themselves
because they were not requested to identify themselves on the response.
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PERCENTAGE OF ANSWERING FIRMS CONSIDERING OPERATIONAL
CHANGES TO BE MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
Issues

Florida Firms
(Percentage)

National Firms
(Percentage)

Right of management to go totally out of business
(a) The management decision to shut down
(b) The effect of the decision to shut down

0.0
11.1

0.0
58.8

Plant relocation
(a) The decision to relocate
(b) The effect of relocation

0.0
11.1

2.9
64.7

0.0
5.6

6.1
55.9

Investment in equipment that will displace workers
(a) The decision to invest in such equipment
(b) The effect of such investment

0.0
11.1

0.0
57.6

Introduction of an independent contractor system
of distribution, maintenance, et cetera
(a) The decision to use independent contractors
(b) The effect of the decision

0.0
5.9

2.9
61.8

Sale or merger of the firm
(a) The decision to sell or merge
(b) The effect of the sale or merger

0.0
0.0

0.0
52.9

Subcontracting
(a) The decision to subcontract
(b) The effect of the decision to subcontract

All of the above questions have been held by the Board to be mandatory issues of bargaining. 19 The validity of the responses must be
discounted for inherent defects in the structure of the questionnaire
and the natural bias of those who responded, 20 but the great disparity
between the answers of the Florida firms and the national firms is
significant.
The questionnaire elicited attitudes as opposed to "legal positions."
The comments from the Florida firms in many instances were quite
vehement in their assertion that the best interests of the employees
could be served by the company and not by a union. Such attitudes
form the basis of many actions resulting in unfair labor practice
charges and extensive, expensive litigation.
Many southern states, such as Florida, presently are the objects of
intense organizational campaigns by the unions. In this respect these
19. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325
F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1964); Adams Dairy, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforced as modified, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEr 3255 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1964) (No. 741); Renton
News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
20. See note 18 supra.
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states are now in the position occupied by the heavily unionized
northern states twenty years ago. This is reflected by the results of the
survey. The process of unionization in Florida will be accomplished
with less friction if the Board takes pains to communicate clearly
to management its policies on these various issues. The tremendous
cost and suffering involved in discovering the Board's policies "the
hard way" can at least be partially averted by diligent inquiry into
current Board policies by management and its legal counsel.
In its initial rulings on the subject, the Board held that an employer could institute operational changes without prior consultation
with the union. The Board's only restriction was that the changes
could not be motivated by union animus.21 Although the Board held
that an employer did not have to discuss the decision with the union,
he did have to bargain over the economic impact of the change on
the displaced employees.22 This reasoning has now been extended to
include the decision to institute changes as a mandatory subject of
bargaining upon a request by the union.2 3 The practical effect of this
policy is to prohibit an employer from instituting any unilateral business changes, which substantially affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment of the bargaining unit, without first bargaining
in good faith with the union involved if it has requested the employer
to do so. In at least one recent case the Board has apparently gone
so far as to hold that the employer in such cases must of his own
initiative discuss the proposed change with the union in the absence of
a prior request to do so. 24 The controversy surrounding the question

whether
decision
areas of
down of

collective bargaining is to be a required prerequisite to a
to institute operational changes has primarily concerned the
(1) subcontracting, (2) automation and, (3) complete shutthe business facilities.

THE DECISION

To

MAKE OPERATIONAL CHANGES-

A

MANDATORY

SUBJECT OF BARGAINING

Subcontracting
In 1962 the Board, overruling its holding of a year earlier, 25 held
in several decisions that employers must bargain with employees'
21. W. L. Rives Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 772 (1959), enforcement denied, 288 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1961); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947); Hays Corp.,
64 N.L.R.B. 406 (1945).
22. Smith's Van S& Transp. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1059 (1960); Mount Hope
Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir.
1954); National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952), aff'd on rehearing, 106 N.L.R.B.
819 (1953), enforcement denied, 215 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1954).
23. Adams Dairy, Inc., supra note 19.
24. Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
25. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
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representatives prior to deciding whether to subcontract part of their
27
the company
operations. 2 6 In Town & Country Manufacturing Co.
had subcontracted its trucking operations one month after union
certification. The Board found that the decision to subcontract was
discriminatorily motivated 2s and, by way of dictum, stated that the
company would have been under a duty to bargain even if its decision
had been based entirely upon economic considerations. 29 The opinion
thus indicated a willingness to extend considerably the scope of
section 8 (a) (5). The Fifth Circuit ° ignored this dictum, however, and
enforced the Board's order that the company reinstate its drivers
with back pay, abrogate the subcontract, and, upon request by the
union, bargain with respect to the decision to subcontract.
In that the Board's order was based upon a finding of discrimination and on this basis enforced by the court, Town & Country is
consistent with previous decisions of the Board. 31 Moreover, the
Board's conclusion that the actual change in working conditions of
the bargaining unit constituted a "unilateral change in wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" was in line with the
32
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Benne Katz.
Shortly after its decision in Town & Country the Board in Fibreboard PaperProducts Corp.33 gave effect to its proposed extension of
section 8 (a) (5) made in the former case. The collective bargaining
agreement in Fibreboardprovided for automatic renewal on July 31,
1959, if neither party gave notice of its desire to seek modification.
On May 26, 1959, the union gave notice and tried to arrange bargaining sessions. The company did not meet with the union until July
27 when it announced that the maintenance work performed by the
26. Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 966 (1962), enforcement denied, 321 F.2d
397 (9th Cir. 1963); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962),
enforced sub nom. East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforced as modified, 322
F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3255 (U.S. Jan.
8, 1964) (No. 741); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced,
316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
27. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
28. The employer had also visited the homes of a number of his employees
informing them that if the union came in, he would subcontract.
29. Town & Country Mfg. Co., supra note 26, at 1027.
30. Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
31. W. L. Rives Co., .125 N.L.R.B. 772 (1959), enforcement denied, 288 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1961) (subcontracting); Industrial Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162
(1957), enforced per curiam sub nom. NLRB v. MacKneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th
Cir. 1959) (transferring work to subsidiary); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1952), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954)
(changing to independent contractor system).
32. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
33. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
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union workers would be subcontracted effective August 1, and that
further negotiations would therefore be useless. The Board had originally determined that the company's decision was economically motivated, and since the entire bargaining unit represented had been
extinguished, the company had committed no unfair labor practice.34
On reconsideration, however, the Board held that the company's
economic motive did not justify its refusal to bargain over the decision to subcontract work performed by the unit. 3 5 The company was

directed to cancel its subcontract, bargain with the union, and reinstate the discharged employees with back pay from the date of the
second decision.36 The District of Columbia Circuit adopted the
Board's extension of section 8 (a) (5) and enforced its order.3
In Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB 38 the company and the recently certified union failed to reach an agreement after several meetings. The
company, foreseeing the possibility of a strike, decided to subcontract
the work performed by the unit employees. When the strike occurred,
the company executed the subcontract and informed the employees
that the new arrangement was permanent. The Board held that the
company had failed to discharge its duty to bargain under section
8 (a) (5) and ordered the same remedy as that given in Town &
Country. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement holding that an employer commits no unfair labor practice
when he does not, during an economic strike, on his own initiative,
offer to bargain with a striking union about a decision to subcontract. 39
NLRB v. Adams Dairy Inc.40 illustrates the typical business de-

cision that invokes the doctrine of Town & Country. Adams Dairy
was a processor and seller of milk and milk products. It employed
both driver-salesmen and independent contractors to deliver and sell
milk. The driver-salesmen had been represented by the union under
the collective bargaining agreement since 1954. During negotiations
for a new contract, the union unsuccessfully sought a contract clause
that would have prohibited the company from substituting independent contractors for the driver-salesmen on company routes. In November and December of 1959 the company outlined its unfavorable
competitive position to the union and requested that the union propose a feasible solution. The union offered no acceptable plan, and
34. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1560 (1961).
35. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). It was not denied
that the employer would realize annual savings of $225,000 as a result of such
a change.
36. Id. at 554-55.
37. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
38.

321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).

39. Id. at 400.
40.

322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3255
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on February 22, 1960 the company substituted independent contractors
for its twenty-four driver-salesmen. The collective bargaining agreement contained the provision that "Nothing herein contained . . .
shall prevent the employer from .. eliminating any route or routes
... "41 The contract further provided that the employer make payments of four months' wages in the event of termination. The employer actually paid only one week's wages. Despite the specific
language of the existing collective bargaining agreement and the fact
that no discriminatory motive could be found, the Board followed
Fibreboard and ordered reinstatement with back pay for the discharged driver-salesmen.
The Eighth Circuit refused enforcement of the Board's order
directing reinstatement with back pay for the driver-salesmen whose
employment had been terminated. 42 Quoting extensively from the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,43 the court
held that the Board had not shown the requisite illegal intent on the
part of the company and that the company's legitimate business purpose was a defense to the unfair labor practice charge. In Erie Resistor the Court concluded that an employer must have a specific
illegal intent to discourage unionism before he is guilty of an unfair
labor practice or that his decision itself must have, as its natural
consequences, a discouragement of union membership constituting
an encroachment upon the vested interests of the employees. 44 The
Adams court found that the natural consequences of the managerial
decision to terminate the driver-salesmen was not such conduct that
carried its own indicia of illegal intent.45 The court held that although
the employer was not obligated to bargain over the decision to subcontract, he was obligated to bargain over the effects of his decision.
Moreover it stated that this obligation should be satisfied by an adherence to the contract terms, which had contemplated the contingency that occurred, that is, payment of four-months wages upon
termination."
Classificationof OperationalChanges
Implicit within the Board's holding in Town & Country is the
concept that the employer has a duty to bargain only with respect
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1964) (No. 741).
41. 322 F.2d at 562-63.
42.

Id. at 563.

43. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
44. 373 U.S. at 227-28.
45. In Erie Resistor the employer's grant of super-seniority to replacements
and employees who deserted the strike, was held to have as its natural consequences a discouragement of union membership. 373 U.S. at 230.
46. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 563 (1963).
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to those decisions to make operational changes that fall within the
statutory provision "wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment." The same principles underlying the subcontracting cases
would seem to be equally applicable where the employees are shifted to
different departments or their work week is materially shortened because of the change. However, when the contemplated change has
a less substantial impact upon the terms and conditions of employment, the employer may be justified in refusing to bargain about his
decision. 47 In this situation the Board could adopt one of three approaches in determining whether the employer had violated section
8 (a) (5): (1) the existence of a subjective belief of the employer that
conditions of employment would not be substantially affected would
constitute a defense to a charge of a refusal to bargain in good faith;
(2) an objective test requiring a reasonable belief that bargaining
was not necessary; or (3) the Board might hold the employer guilty
of an unfair labor practice if it disagreed with his belief that a change
8
would not substantially affect conditions of employment.4
The present philosophy of the Board indicates that any decision
to change operations that would substantially affect employment falls
within the purview of "terms and conditions of employment," and
is therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining. Conditions of employment may also be drastically affected by a decision to purchase
or sell assets, relocate or terminate operations, introduce automation,
or merge corporations. This philosophy represents the final turn in
the wheel of values from emphasis on maximum industrial productivity regardless of the cost to labor to a scheme whereby the economic
welfare of the affected workers is considered prior to a decision to
institute production-increasing operational changes.
This turnabout in the social conscience is strikingly illustrated by
a comparison of two similar cases, decided sixty-five years apart. In
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 4 9 decided in 1897, the employer, a manufacturer of barrels and casks, installed in its cooperage plant certain
machines that materially lessened the cost of manufacture. The
Coopers Union demanded that the employer discontinue the use of
these hooping machines and revert to the exclusive manufacture of
hand-hooped barrels. When the employer refused, the union induced
a boycott of all products packaged in machine-hooped barrels. The
Eighth Circuit held the employees' conduct was unlawful in that its
effect, "was to deprive the public at large of the advantages to be
47. See Shell Oil Co., 53 LAB. REL. REP. 217 (July 2, 1963) (decision of trial
examiner).
48. An NLRB trial examiner recently intimated that the third standard would
be applicable since the employer "can easily avoid the peril by resolving any
doubts in favor of notifying and bargaining with the union." Id. at 219.
49. 83 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1897).
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derived from the use of an invention which was not only designed
to diminish the cost of making certain necessary articles, but to lessen
the labor of human hands."
In Renton News Record,50 decided in 1962, the employer, in order
to meet increased competition and expanding markets, decided to
utilize a cold-type method of composition that gave an increased
volume of production at lower cost, provided a superior final product,
and afforded an increased flexibility over past operations. To facilitate
this change the publisher, along with other local publishers, set up
an independent corporation to handle their cold-type composition
needs.
The Board held that the employer violated section 8 (a) (5) by refusing to bargain with the union concerning its desire to implement
automation and the effect of such change upon its composing room
employees. Reiterating its philosophy suggested in Town & Country
and established in Fibreboard, the Board concluded: 51
The change in the method of operations in this case is the
result of technological improvements. Obviously, such improvements serve the interests of the economy as a whole and
contribute to the wealth of the nation. Nevertheless, the impact of automation on a specific category of employees is a matter of grave concern to them. It may involve not only their
present but their future employment in the skills for which
they have been trained. Accordingly, the effect of automation
on employment is a joint responsibility of employers and the
representatives of the employees involved.
The Board's reasoning was based primarily on the proposition that
"the adverse effect of changes in operation brought about due to improved, and even radically changed, methods and equipment, could
be at least partially dissipated by timely advance planning by the employer and the bargaining representative of its employees."52
In 1897 the value placed upon "progress" measured by a decrease
in the number of man-hours necessary to achieve production was
paramount. In contrast, the value placed on the displacement of
workers in a community in which jobs were abundant was inconsequential. Today, an abundance of job opportunities, particularly for
the unskilled, no longer exists, thus the desirability of increased production must now be balanced with the goal of full employment.

50.
51.
52.

136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
136 N.L.R.B. at 1297.
136 N.L.R.B. at 1297-98.
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Complete Termination of Business Operations
Perhaps the most emotional issue in the area of operational changes
concerns the question whether management must bargain with the
union prior to making a decision to go out of business. In Star Baby
Co.53 the employer, in order to discourage unionization, liquidated
his entire clothing manufacturing business. Although the employer
violated section 8 (a) (5) by offering salary increases to individual
employees engaged in a recognition strike, the Board stated: "By unilaterally terminating their business operations without informing the
...
54 In
union, the Respondents further violated Section 8 (a) (5).
Weingarten Food Center55 the employer sold five of his six stores.
Although the complaint was dismissed,56 a majority of the three-member panel stated that the employer was under a duty to bargain before
reaching a decision to sell the stores.
Of recent interest are the decisions of the Board and the Fourth
Circuit in Darlington Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB.57 In Darlington
the employer sustained continued business losses over an extended
period, but during the same period engaged in an extensive modernization of his facilities. Shortly after the union won a representative
election, the employer announced that he was going out of business
and ignored the union's request to bargain.
The employer asserted that he had an unfettered right to go out
of business irrespective of his reasons, including union animosity;
alternatively he contended that he had bona fide economic reasons
for his actions. The Board's position was that an employer may go out
of business for bona fide economic reasons if they were honestly invoked and were not in fact a mere pretense to cover discrimination. 58
The Board concluded, however, that an employer may not go out of
business without violating section 8 (a) (3) if partially motivated by
discrimination against the union. Section 8 (a) (3) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ....

53. 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963).

54. 140 N.L.R.B. at 681.
55.

140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962).

56. The complaint was dismissed because the NLRB General Counsel had
failed to argue this violation before the trial examiner and therefore was prevented
from raising the issue for the first time before the panel.
57. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1964).
58. Compare Savoy Laundry, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 306 (1962).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss1/4

12

Golden and Tiballi: Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining–Operational Changes
1964]

NOTES

In Darlingtonthe Board stated: 59
Darlington discriminated in regard to its employees tenure
of employment by dosing its plant - thereby discharging the
employees - and, because the plant closing was the direct result
of the employees' selection of the Charging Union as their collective-bargaining representative, Darlington's retaliation against
the employees for their activities in behalf of the Union discouraged the employees' continued membership in the Union.
Neither the Board nor the Fourth Circuit reached the question
whether an employer, who solely for economic reasons desires to
terminate his business, must first consult with the union. The Board
did not rely upon the principles of Town & Country, but rather upon
the specific wording of section 8 (a) (3).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in a three-to-two decision,
60
denied enforcement of the Board's order stating that:
The fundamental purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act is to preserve and protect the rights of both industry and
labor so long as they are in the relationship of employer and
employee . . . It does not compel one to become or remain
an employer ....
If cessation of business is adopted to avoid

labor relations, the proprietor pays the price of it: permanent
dissolution of his business, in whole or in part.
Thus the employer was found to have an unrestrained right to decide
unilaterally to go out of business without committing an unfair labor
practice. 61 The Darlington case is now pending before the Supreme
Court.
Decisions in Conflict
It is clear that the Board maintains the position that an employer
who is desirous of altering his operations to the economic detriment
of his employees must engage in collective bargaining prior to effecting
such change. When the employer acts to defeat union activity, the
Board, with assurance of judicial affirmation, is quick to find a section
59. 139 N.L.R.B. at 247. See, e.g., NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346
(4th Cir. 1962).
60. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963).
61. But cf. NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1963), in
which the court found that an employer violated §§8 (a)(1) and (3) by shutting
down its mine after threatening to do so because of his employees' union activities.
The court in Darlington, however, distinguished Norma Mining on the basis that
Darlington was an absolute desistance not a temporary intermission as apparently
contemplated by Norma Mining.
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8 (a) (3) violation. When the employer is motivated purely by economic reasons, the Board may nevertheless find a violation of section
8 (a) (5). In this regard four circuit courts of appeal have reached
conflicting decisions on the issue of subcontracting.
In Town & Country 62 the Fifth Circuit ignored the language of
the Board to the effect that economic motivation did not foreclose
a possibility of a section 8 (a) (5) violation, but the court enforced
the Board's order on the basis of substantial evidence that the company's decision was the result, at least in part, of a determination
to undermine the union. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held in Fibreboard,63 however, that an employer must bargain about a decision to subcontract even if based
solely on economic grounds.

In Hawaii Meat6 4 the Ninth Circuit

denied enforcement of the Board's order upon the narrow ground
that during an economic strike an employer does not have to take the
initiative in offering the union an opportunity to bargain about the
economic decision to subcontract. The Eighth Circuit in Adams
Dairy65 held that there must be a discriminatory intent and motivation, actual or implied, before the court will sustain a finding of an
unfair labor practice. The Adams court stated, "that the decision
on the part of Adams to terminate a phase of its business and distribute all of its products through independent contractors was not a
required subject of collective bargaining."66
There is a direct conflict between the Eighth Circuit in Adams
Dairy and the District of Columbia Circuit in Fibreboard. Only the
District of Columbia Circuit in Fibreboard has directly upheld the
Board's position with reference to economically motivated decisions.The Ninth Circuit in Hawaii Meat assumed arguendo that in the
absence of an economic strike an employer must bargain about
the economic decision to subcontract.68 This language indicates a
rapport with the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Fibreboard and a potential adoption of the Board's position. Two days
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fibreboard,69 the union
in Adams Dairy filed its petition for the writ.70
62.

NLRB v. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).

63. NLRB v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
64.

NLRB v. Hawaii Meat Co., 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).

65. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
66. Id. at 562. (Emphasis added.)
67. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced sub norn.
East Bay Union of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
68. 321 F.2d at 398.
69. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 84 Sup. Ct. 490 (1964).
70. Adams Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3255 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1964) (No.
741).
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Remedy
If the Supreme Court establishes that the employer is under a duty
to bargain over the decision to make operational changes, a serious
problem arises as to the proper remedy in the event of unilateral action by the employer. The Board has generally required a return
of the status quo ante.71 Such a remedy requires an employer, who
acted solely for economic reasons, to reinstate the affected employees
and to resume the operation he discontinued without consulting
the union. The Board's rationale is that "no genuine bargaining over
a decision to terminate a phase of an operation can be conducted
'7 2
where that decision has already been made and implemented."
However, special facts and circumstances may vary the remedy. For
example, in Renton News Record73 the company was faced with the
choice of either changing its method of operations or going out of
business. It selected the former alternative. The company's change
involved a totally different process and required the participation of
other weekly neiispapers. In this situation the Board did not order the
company to resume its operation because resumption would have
had a detrimental impact on participants who were not parties to
the suit. Such an order would have been a penalty and not a remedial
action. Thus, the employer was required only to bargain with the
union as to the effect of such a change on its employees. Another
illustrative case is Star Baby74 in which a partnership was liquidated
upon the discontinued operation of the business. The employer, who
had discriminatorily dosed his plants and discharged his employees,
was not ordered to resume operations or to reinstate his employees.
However, he was required to place the discharged employees on a
preferential hiring list and to reinstate them in the event that either
one of the partners resumed operations. Moreover, he was required
to reimburse the employees for the period extending from completion
of disposal of his business assets (thus effectuating the discharges of
these employees) to such time as each employee secured substantially
equivalent employment.75

71. See, e.g., Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 966, 973 (1962); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 556 (1962); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 1022, 1032 (1962). Compare Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 814, 817
(1962) where the Board, in requiring reinstatement of terminated employees, did
not specifically order abrogation of the subcontracts.
72. Town 8&Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1026 (1962).
73. 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
74. 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963).

75. Id. at 672.
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Future Trends in Litigation
Darlington Manufacturing Co. 76 represents the hybrid situation

where the employer completely terminates his operations partially for
economic reasons and partially because of union animus. The facts
of Darlington should be viewed with two points in mind. First, because there is some question whether Darlington Manufacturing Co.
is a single employer or a subsidiary of a larger complex, the decision
of the Fourth Circuit may not stand for the proposition that an employer can unilaterally decide to close his business. Second, the employer's conduct is clearly open to criticism. It is undisputed that the
Darlington Company had carried on a running battle with the union
for a considerable period of time prior to ceasing its operations.
These factors may prevent the Supreme Court from reaching the
question of Darlington's "right" to go out of business purely for
economic reasons, for if the Court finds Darlington was a single employer, the company's apparent union animus may motivate the Court
to base its decision on section 8 (a) (3)77 and accordingly reverse the
Fourth Circuit.
In all probability the Supreme Court will adopt the position of
the Board and the District of Columbia Circuit in Fibreboard and
reject the Eighth Circuit's position in Adams Dairy. Both employers
dealt with the union in an arbitrary manner. Neither company's
decision was precipitated by an economic strike,78 nor one that they
were unable to anticipate because of a sudden change in the company's business environment. The following factors should be relevant: (1) the indication of the employer's bad faith in failing to inform the union of its intention to institute an operation change; (2)
the union's continuing interest in this issue; (3) the possibility that
the union may have offered an acceptable solution to the employer's
difficulty had the union been informed; (4) the general need to
prevent unnecessary erosion of the labor force, and (5) the over-all
need to effectuate the policy of the Act by encouraging the peaceful
settlement of disputes through consensual agreements between the
parties.

76. 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
77. For examples of operational changes found to violate §8 (a) (3) see NLRB
v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962) (work subcontracted to another
employer); NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Corp., 302 F.2d 280 (1st Cir.
1962) (plant shut down then work resumed under subcontract guise); NLRB v.
Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961) (plant shut down and
work transferred to another plant owned by same employer).
78. Cf. NLRB v. Hawaii Meat Co., 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963); Betts Cadillac-
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The union in Fibreboard was informed of the decision only four
days before it was to be implemented.79 This relieves the union from
any charge of unreasonableness. The union in Adams Dairy, however,
had sought unsuccessfully to include a clause in the existing contract
that would prevent Adams from selling employees' routes to independent contractors; but there is no indication that the union had
over the decision
dearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain
80
to extend the use of independent contractors.
The technical argument advanced by management in Darlington
Manufacturing Co. and the first Fibreboard decision, to the effect
that once its decision is implemented the unit is extinguished and
therefore the workers are no longer employees and as a result are
not protected by the Act, is simply begging the question.8' The purpose of the Act is to bring the parties together, not to deepen the
schism.
The delineation of those activities that are mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining must be kept flexible so that the Act can be
administered to meet the changing conditions of society.8 2 In enforc83
ing the Board's order in Fibreboard,the court stated:
The purpose of imposing legal duties upon employers to
meet and bargain with the representatives of employees is to
create a structure of industrial self-government for a particular
plant arrived at by consensual agreement between management and employees within the framework of the statute.
By imposing such a duty on the employer, it may be possible to partially eliminate industrial strife. Management has a right to operate
its business in the most efficient manner possible, and this includes
the right to subcontract unit work when such a change is economically
Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
79. The company's attitude is illustrated by a letter transmitted to the union
representatives four days before the proposed operational change. "For some time
we have been seriously considering the question of letting out our Emeryville
maintenance work to an independent contractor, and have now reached a definite
decision to do so effective August 1, 1959. In these circumstances, we are sure you
will realize that negotiation of a new contract would be pointless. However, if you
have any questions, we will be glad to discuss them with you." Fibreboard Paper
Prods. 322 F.2d 411, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
80. See Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680
(2d Cir. 1952). During the existence of a contract, the Jacobs rule relieves either
party from an obligation to discuss subjects and proposals that were explored in
the negotiation of the contract but upon which no agreement was reached.
81. Cf. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1560 (1961).
82. NLRB v. Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
83. 322 F.2d at 414.
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advantageous. But management's need for operational flexibility must
be viewed in context with the effect of such decisions upon the labor
force.14 Society's requirement that a peaceful compromise be reached
necessitates some sacrifice of management's freedom to act unilaterally.
When the union is given the opportunity to bargain over the decision, it is placed in a preventive rather than a remedial position.
Once in this position it becomes in the union's own self-interest to
suggest economically feasible alternatives s- upon which an agreement
can be reached. 86 If the union has participated in reaching the decision, that decision will generally be more acceptable to the union's
rank and file even though detrimental to their interest. Further, the
employer by bargaining with the union can only enhance his position
in the eyes of the Board.
CONCLUSION

The Dividing Line Between Mandatory and Nonmandatory
BargainingIssues
It is important to realize the far-reaching impact of Borg Warner,
for the Court in this decision has established that good-faith negotiation to an impasse on a lawful subject of bargaining constitutes per
se an unfair labor practice if such issue falls within the nonmandatory
84. Plant removals and subcontracting obviously results in the loss of employment for individual workers. The burden of unemployment is particularly
heavy when the workers affected are over forty years of age, have limited or
nontransferable skills, are members of minority groups, and are thrown into labor
markets where considerable slack already exists.
85. In Adams Dairy, if the company had informed the union of its need to
extend its use of independent contractors to meet the demands of competition,
the union might have acceded to Adams earlier proposals to reduce the unit of
pay for the employees. "Certainly in some cases, the adverse effect of changes in
operation . . . could be at least partially dissipated by timely advance planning by
the employer and the bargaining representatives of the employees." Town &
Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1297-98. However, it is difficult to conceive
how the Board could find the union had no indication of the changeover after
Adams had repeatedly asked the union's aid in improving the company's deteriorating competitive position.
86. "The consequences of Town and Country are far less fearsome than its
critics anticipate. Labor, like management, has no suicidal instinct. Enlightened
management has long recognized that a stable and adequately paid working force
is essential to its own well-being, and enlightened labor knows its own vital stake
in a prosperous economy. There is no basis to anticipate that either labor or
management will prove more intransigent, more intractable on issues of subcontracting, of automation, of technological improvement than they proved to be
on bread-and-butter issues of wages and hours in a more depressed economy."
Address by Arnold Ordman, Labor Law Section of the Georgia Bar Association,
March 15, 1963, in 52 L.R.R.M. 86, 90.
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classification. As a practical matter this means that it may be futile
for either party to propose a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. If
the other side objects, it cannot be insisted upon, but must be
dropped. In Borg Warner Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, asserted
that the Board has intruded into the substantive aspects of bargaining,
because "the right to bargain becomes illusory, if one is not free to
' 7
press a proposal made in good faith to the point of insistence."
This nonmandatory category of bargaining issues allows the Board
to sit in judgment on the lawful issues on which the parties can
exert their full powers of persuasion. In this respect the Board has
made an unwarranted intrusion into the collective bargaining process.
Good faith bargaining to an impasse on any legal subject should not
be a violation of the Act. Collective bargaining is a flexible and dynamic process. The Board should restrain itself from interfering
with the bargaining relationship by dictating what the parties may
or may not discuss. The" test should always be: (1) whether the subject itself is legal, and (2) whether good faith exists. A distinction
between a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining should not
be relevant.
The Decision To Institute OperationalChangesas a Mandatory
Subject of Bargaining
The dynamic scope of collective bargaining must continue to
expand -not because of the zeal or the perversity of labor or management, but rather because of the simple economic fact that our
industrial complex is growing. A member of the Board has observed:88
Today the twin problems of chronic unemployment and
automation have given greater dimension to the issues involved;
the economic climate surrounding bargaining as to subcontracting or the curtailment of operations has become more acute in
an economy where upwards of four to five million employable
men and women find themselves unemployed.
The Board has decided that the elimination of unit jobs, albeit
for economic reasons, is a matter encompassed by the statutory phrase
"other terms and conditions of employment," and is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 8 (a) (5).
It is important to remember, as the majority stated in Town &
Country, that this obligation neither restrains an employer from
formulating or effectuating an economic decision to terminate a phase
of his business nor obligates him to yield to a union's demand that
87.
88.

356 U.S. at 352 (dissenting opinion).
Fanning, The Duty to Bargainin 1962, 14 LAS. L.J. 18, 23 (1963).
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a subcontract not be executed s9 The obligation does require the
parties to engage in prior discussion before taking unilateral action
that substantially affects "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment."
The critics of the Town & Country -Fibre board principle have
relied heavily on the proposition that the bargaining leading to an
agreement or impasse may be lengthy. Meanwhile, the employer
who may be faced with dire business necessity is deprived of both
freedom of decision and power to act. Thus the Board's decision is
considered as a usurpation of management's prerogatives and a hindering factor in its drive for operational flexibility. However, these
allegations are not altogether realistic. Normally there is a considerable interim between the time that an employer assesses his need for
an operational change and its actual implementation. During this
interval a discussion of these proposed changes with the representatives of the employees would not be economically detrimental.
When a union files a complaint of an unfair labor practice because
of the employer's unilateral action, the Board should take into consideration the amount of time within which the employer could have
bargained with the union without substantial economic injury, the
existence or nonexistence of dire economic necessity, and the good
faith of the employer.
The test in this area must be a flexible one. Failure of an employer to bargain with respect to a decision to institute operational
changes should not be per se an unfair labor practice. There will
undoubtedly be a time when an employer is economically forced to
implement such changes at once and cannot afford to discuss them in
advance with the union. Under such circumstances the employer's
immediate business necessity outweighs the benefits to be derived from
prior discussion; and if the employer has acted in good faith, unilateral action should not be an unfair labor practice.
For the present, management must accept the fact that, whenever
able, it is required to engage in good-faith discussions prior to making
certain decisions. Of course if after such discussions an impasse is
reached, an employer is free to implement such unilateral changes as
his economic position dictates.
FREDERICK

ROBERT

89.

N.

P.

TIBALLI

GOLDEN

136 N.L.R.B. at 1026.
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